Refutation of the Doctrinal Positions of the Dawlat ash-Shaytan: Conceptions of Wilayat

Wilayat al Ummah

So our corporation is the Ummah of Islam and its shareholders are individual Muslims.  So who chooses the Board of Directors and its Chairman Imam? Who chooses the Executive Committee and the CEO Amir al Mu’mineen? As with any corporate entity, it must be the shareholders.  And it is this power of the shareholders to elect their Directors which we refer to as political power. 

Elsewhere we have discussed Wilayat al Ummah and Shura Islamic Democracy.  But briefly, governance in Islam is in the hands of the individual Muslims, who agree through Shura Consensus on who should have authority over them.  It is the Ummah that reaches consensus on the qualifications of its mujtahids and fuqaha.  It does so based on the command to obey Allah SWT and His Messenger SAW.  Thus it bases its decisions on the guidance of the Qur’an and Sunnah. 

We are all Ahl al Sunnah.  The Umayyads and their Mu’tazilah theorists based decision on concept that wahy is subservient to reason and so reason alone can derive fiqh.  They are the Ahl al Rayy – the people of human opinion.  But we today, Hanifiyya, Zaydi, Maliki, Shari’I, Hanbali, Ikhwani, Salafi, Ja’afari; all follow the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  We may have different minaahij for deriving fiqh, but we all recognize the source of Shariah as the wahy contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah, and that wahy is not subservient to reason.  [1]

Despite the differences (iktilaf) we have in fiqh, we are all able to reach consensus on the Sources of Shariah, and that we require minaahij to understand the Shariah.  We have consensus that opinion alone, despite being based in reason, is not a legitimate way to derive fiqh, and so any one who uses this method would not be qualified for our Board of Directors.  We have reached consensus that our mujtahids and fuquha must have knowledge and must have a minhaj for deriving fiqh that is based in the Qur’an and Sunnah. 

The Directors must base their decisions on dalil or evidence, and not simply opinion.  We may not agree on the result, but with dalil we are able to see the faqih’s steps at arriving at a decision and thereby make up our own minds.  Since we are individually tasked with obeying Allah and His Messenger, this provision of evidence, dalil, is critical in order to satisfy our own due diligence.  After all, ijtehad is due diligence, and as fiduciaries, our fuqaha must exercise it.  And we require it to assure our own minds of the validity of the rulings of fiqh these fuqaha derive. 

So the Ummah is responsible for Wilayat – governance by being responsible for choosing those who are Waliyyu l’amr. 

But, governance is not all legislation and regulation.  What about enforcement?  We are each charged with obeying, but reality is we do not always do so.  So who enforces the law?  And who determines who does so?

Enforcement Authority

Enforcement.  It is not a pleasant word to many.  Would not it be wonderful if we could live in a world where everyone really cared about everyone else and we all kept the interests of others in mind and did not act in conflict to the rights of others?  Maybe in the next life, but this Hayyat al Duniya is different.  There are those who either due to weakness in controlling their ego and selfish tendencies, or due to actual desire to harm, insist on disobeying the laws Allah SWT has provided to create a just society.  They disobey Him and break the social contract with us. 

Allah SWT has stated in the Qur’an that He will punish wrongdoers in this life and the next.  He is fully capable of enforcing His own laws, His Huquq Allah.  He needs no one to do it for Him. However, He has also made provision in His Qur’an for addressing the fact that wrongdoers also break the social contract with us, and so He has made provision for enforcement of the rights of man – Huquq al Insaan.  And He has given us guidance for the punishment of crimes that involve the rights of Allah and of man. 

Allah SWT has revealed the Hadd punishments for serious felony crimes such as hirabah, theft, adultery and fornication, slander, and murder.  He has also given us guidance as to how to judge crimes with more discretionary punishments, through the record of the judgments of the Prophet and of Ali ibn Abi Talib.  Through the practice of the Prophet SAW, we also learn how to appoint Qadis, police officials, zakat collectors, and governors; all forms of enforcement officials.

Through the Sunnah, we also learn about how to choose amirs or leaders.  These leaders form the project directors and teams leaders who will deal with implementing the law and ensuring that the Ummah achieves the objectives (maqaasid) of the Shariah. 

So, what is the Sunnah as to choosing an Amir?  For this we must look to the choosing of the Prophet as Amir.  Allah SWT chose him as Prophet, but the people of Madina chose him to be their Amir.  How was he chosen?  First, the people searched for appropriate candidates.  Abdullah Ibn Salul was at one time a candidate. 

Once when the Holy Prophet was passing on the way Abdullah bin Ubayy spoke to him in harsh words. When the Holy Prophet complained of it to Hadrat Sa'd bin Ubadah; he said:"O Messenger of Allah, don't be hard on him, for when Allah sent you to us we were making a diadem to crown him, and, by God, he thinks that you have robbed him of his kingdom." (Ibn Hisham vol: II, pp. 237-238).

This hadith teaches us that the people of Yathrib elected their Amirs.  The Amir was chosen by general consensus of the people.  I believe this was the method preferred by our Prophet SAW.  He himself was so elected by the people of Yathrib after the oathtakers of Aqabah asked him to come to the city.  They elected him and signed the Constitution of Madina, agreeing that he would be their Amir. 

As he neared his own death, our beloved Prophet SAW was preparing for something.  Make of it what you will.  He put Ali ibn Abi Talib in charge of Madina, and sent the son of his “adopted son,” Usama ibn Zaid, out to gather all the Sahabi at a location well outside of Madina.  They were instructed to await orders to go far from Madina to encounter the Roman allies.  Certainly any one can appreciate the tactical advantage of placing your strongest general in charge of the home fort, something the Prophet wisely did when he marched on Tabuk, and also the advantage of placing a very loyal commander in charge of a group who might contain rebellious elements.  Both of these considerations played a role in the choice of Ali and Usama as commanders at that time.

Why would there have been rebellious elements?  Arab tribes utilized several methods to determine leadership including heredity, merit and ability, election by the heads of clans, appointment by the predecessor, and election by consensus.[2]  Therefore, not everyone in Madina may have agreed on the method of general election.  Moreover, Umar was rightly concerned that the Quraish tribe, still Arabia’s most powerful, would not accept a leader who was not from the Quraish.  He was correct. [3]

Given the history of Arab tribes and their traditions of determining leadership, there is no doubt that disagreements arose regarding succession to the Prophet’s “secular” leadership.  We should note that all the various forms of determining leadership were utilized at some point in Islamic history.  However, evidence strongly points to Wilayat al Ummah as the method preferred by the Prophet SAW. 

1. He knew he was dying yet he did not appoint a successor.  No hadith or ayat of the Qur’an clearly states that he did.  [4]
2. He appoints Ali as Amir in Madina, knowing he will carry out any orders the Prophet should give him
3. He appoints Usama ibn Zaid as commander of the Ghazwah Army, sends him well outside Madina, and tells all the Sahabi, including Abu Bakr and Umar, to go out of Madina and join him, providing Ali with an unobstructed ability to carry out the Prophet’s plans.
4. The Prophet SAW was himself elected as “secular” leader.
5. The Qur’an calls for Shura
6. The Saqifah organization is designed to enable Shura
7. The Prophet SAW used Shura on at least two well-known occasions

The last three points are critical.  Sayed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr held that no evidence for Shura or Consensus exists in the Qur’an or Hadith.  This is false.  First of all, Allah SWT says in Qur’an:

Al Imran 3:159 It was by the mercy of Allah that thou wast lenient with them (O Muhammad), for if thou hadst been stern and fierce of heart they would have dispersed from round about thee. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them upon the conduct of affairs. And when thou art resolved, then put thy trust in Allah. Lo! Allah loveth those who put their trust (in Him).

Ash-Shurah 42:38 And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose “amirhum” is by shurah amongst them, and who spend of what We have bestowed on them,

In Sirah literature, it is related that, “on receiving this timely warning (of the impending attack on Madina by the Quraish), the Prophet (pbuh) gathered his companions around him to discuss what they should do. He thought it would be better to wait for the enemy inside the city rather than go out to meet them, because it would be easier to defend Medina from inside the city walls. But the young Muslims were eager to go out and face Quraysh. They said, '0 Prophet of Allah, lead us out against our enemies, or else they will think we are too cowardly and too weak to fight them.' One of the rulers of Medina, 'Abd Allah ibn Ubayy, however, agreed with the Prophet (pbuh) and advised him to remain in the city, saying, 'Whenever we have gone out to fight an enemy we have met with disaster, but none has ever come in against us without being defeated.’”

But when the Prophet (pbuh) saw that the majority were in favor of going out to meet Quraysh, he decided to do so, and after the Friday prayer he put on his armor.” [5]

Furthermore, after the Seige of Taif, the Muslims returned to Jirana to deal with the booty from the Battle of Hunain.  The Prophet waited ten days to see if the Hawazin tribe, which had come to Islam after Hunain, would come.  They were late so he distributed the booty and the women and children captured in battle.  The Hawazin came finally and the Prophet SAW gave them a choice of either having their money returned or having their loved ones returned.  They asked for their loved ones to be returned.  He immediately agreed to release the share of the Bani Abdul Muttalib. Then he asked the community to gather with their naibs and decide if they would be willing to waive their rights to the slaves.  All but two tribes agreed to waive their rights.  When they learned all the others had voted to waive their rights, one of the two also waived, but one did not and the Prophet SAW then ransomed the women and children himself.  [6]

Finally, the Prophet organized the community in Madina in Saqifa or affinity groups based on neighborhoods or tribes or other aspects of affinity.  These affinity groups elected a Naib or representative who would carry the consensus of the group to the Prophet.  This Saqifa organization is noted in the Sirah literature particularly in the case of the Saqifa Bani Sad’eedah, the Saqifa that was involved in the election of Abu Bakr as Amir al Mumineen.

In short, I find that there is substantial evidence that the correct method of determining amirate in Islam is by shurah or consensus of the Ummah, determined through meeting with community leaders and discussing the issues until a consensus is reached. 

Historical Conceptions of Sultaniyyah

History, however, has had a different view of authority or Sultaniyyah.  Over the course of Islamic history we can trace several approaches.  These include:

1. The Mu’tazillah/Umayyad conception of Khalifat
2. The Abbasid conception of Khalifat
3. Shia conception of Imamate
4. Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of Khalifat, and religious vs enforcement authority

After the Rashiduun, the tribe of the Bani Umayyah came into power.  This clan of the Quraish determined leadership through both appointment by the predecessor, and heredity lineage, usually the eldest son.  Added to this hereditary conception of leadership was an understanding of the authority of the amir that went beyond that of the Rashidun. 

Many think the Umayyads were Sunni.  Both Sunnis and Shia often refer to them as such.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  The school of thought of the Umayyads was Mu’atazillah. [7] We hear this term all the time as one of the heretical doctrines, but do we understand why?  Most do not. 

The Mu’atazillah based their ideas on Greek Philosophy.  In Greek epistemology, there are two forms of knowledge, acquired and rational.  Islam, as we noted, posits three, the third being revelation.  [8] The resulting epistemology is radically different.  Mu’atazillah doctrine holds that the Qur’an is based on acquired and rational knowledge, and therefore, it can supplemented, and even abrogated, by any knowledgeable person. 

Under this doctrine, then, the Umayyads claimed not only the power to enforce the law, but also the power to make the law!  For the Umayyads, Khalifat was actual successorship to the Prophet SAW – they succeeded him as to the power to make law, interpret law and enforce law.  (Istaghfiru Allah).

Gathering in Kufa, Iraq, those who opposed this view were the Sunnis, those who followed the Sunnah of Allah, and the Sunnah of his Prophet SAW.  Allah mentions in the Qur’an that He has a Sunnah, a legacy or tradition, and it is revelation of guidance.

35:43 (Shown in their) behaving arrogantly in the land and plotting evil; and the evil plot encloseth but the men who make it. Then, can they expect aught save the treatment of the folk of old ? Thou wilt not find for Allah's Sunnah any substitute, nor wilt thou find for Allah's Sunnah aught of power to change.

This Sunnah of Allah does not change.  He has provided the same basic guidance to all Mankind, throughout the ages.  Any change of details of Ibaadah and the like have come through the Sunnah or legacy and traditions of the Prophets SAW.  So we are told to obey Allah and obey His Prophet SAW.  We are told to obey revelation, wahy. 

So, those who gathered in Kufa and became our Imams held that no human could alter, supplement or abrogate revelation.  Only Allah could do that.  These were the Sunnis, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafii, Imam Zaid, and in Madina, Imam Malik and Imam Jaa’afar.  And it was Imam Hussein who spoke out for the Sunnah of Allah and His Messenger, and his travel to Karbalaa was, in reality, to support Sunni ideals in Kufa against the erroneous Umayyad doctrines. 

After the Abbasids came to power, the view of Khalifat changed.  The Abbasids followed the Sunni understanding of authority and called their movement, “Ahl al Sunnah wa al-Jamaa.”  Many associate this with Ibn Taymiyyah and the Salafi, but it was used by the Abbasids to indicate the primacy of the Sunnah and the fact that Muslims were united under their rule. 

Abu’l Hasan al-Mawardi, in his great book, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, views Khalifat as a fard al kifayyah, “it must then be known that it is incumbent in a social and collective way.” [9]  Equating the terms Imamate and Khalifat, he considers that it is prescribed to succeed Prophethood “as a means of protecting the deen and of managing of the affairs of this world.” [10]  Moreover, he interprets the verse on waliyyu l’amr as referring this concept of Khalifat.[11]  The Abbasids, then viewed Khalifat as the authority regulate the deen of Islam and to enforce the Shariah Law.  During their time, while the Khalif retained the ultimate authority as to matters of deen, and the ultimate authority to enforce the law through Qadi courts and hisbah or police powers.  However, he could delegate these powers to wazirs, officials, the police, and the courts.  However, one thing was clear, unlike the Umayyads, the Abbasids understood that legislative power lay only with Allah SWT.

However, during this time, a disagreement arose as to the nature and scope of Imamate. 

In the first instance, the Ahl al Sunnah Ulema continued to feel that it was the scholars who had the greatest authority to interpret the law. During this period, the madhdhaahib flourished.  Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, Hanbali schools all reached their greatest levels of development in Baghdad under the Abbasid Khalifs.  The power of the Ulema often rivaled that of the Khalif in matters of Deen.  Over time, the Khalif’s power over the deen came to mean his power to appoint scholars to advise the court in Shariah interpretation and to control the appointment of Imam al-Masaajid and Khawatibs.  As a result, the term Imam came to refer to one who had authority in deen, and Khalif to one who had the authority to enforce the law.

There was one thing both the Umayyad and Abbasid Khalifs agreed upon, however; whatever the nature or extent of authority of the Khalif, he must be of the Quraish tribe.  The belief in this hereditary right began with the choosing of Abu Bakr as the first Amir al-Mu’mineen.  Umar understood that the Quraish tribe, newly brought into the fold of Islam at the Fatah Makkah, would not accept a non-Quraishi leader.  So when the people of Madina tried to elect a person from among themselves, he and Abu Bakr bolted across town and demanded that they elect Abu Bakr.  It was as Umar said, a falta or quick and dirty solution.  And the people of Madina agreed because they were not really comfortable to elect any of their own people to the position.  Years of war between the two main tribes of Madina, the Aws and Khasraj, had led to exhaustion.  They had elected the Prophet as their leader because they saw him as the one who could stop the war, solve the issues of the feud between the tribes and restore order and peace.  If the people of Madina elected anyone, he would have to be from one of the tribes, at the expense of the other.  Therefore, the choice of Abu Bakr, a well-respected elder and close friend of the Prophet SAW, who came from a small sub-clan of the Quraish, and hence was not connected to any tribe involved heavily in the repression of Muslims, was acceptable to everyone.  It really was an excellent choice for the time.[12]

However, one of the evidential reasons given for preferring Abu Bakr was a reported hadith of the Prophet that command was only with Quraish. [13] Al-Mawardi notes seven conditions for leadership (Imamate).  These include: 1. Justice, 2. Knowledge, 3. Good Health, 4. Physical Soundness, 5. Mental Judgment capable of organizing people and managing their affairs, 6. Courage and Bravery, and 7. “Of the family of Quraysh, because of the text (of a prophetic hadith) on the matter and by virtue of consensus.” [14] al-Mawardi then states that “no credibility should be given to the opinion of Dirar who is alone in saying that the post is open to all…”[15]

Out of this insistence on heredity as a pre-requisite for Khalifat, arose the debate between the Sunni and the Ithna Ashari or Imami Shia.  The Imami Shia held that Imamate was hereditary, but that only the eldest sons of descendents of Hussein, who were appointed successors by their fathers, inherited the qualities and characteristics necessary to be the Imam.  However, the Imami concept of Imamate was deeply influenced by the character and temperament of the son of Imam Hussein, Ali Zain al Abidin as-Sajjad.  In his twenties, he witnessed the horrifying slaughter of almost the entire family of Ali ibn Abi Talib, sons and grandsons.  He and his son were the sole survivors; he because he was gravely ill, and his son because he was only four years of age.  As his name suggests, Ali ibn Hussein spent the rest of his life in prayer and prostration.  He was quiescent.  He rejected any offers of political authority.  His son Muhammad al Baqir, and grandson Ja’afar as-Sadiq, then further develop the concept of Imami Imamate to be protector of the deen, who advises the Ummah, and only steps in to overcome clear departures from the very essence of Islamic teachings, such as the Umayyad belief that they could make law – and then primarily through martyrdom. 

On the other hand, the Zaidi position on Imamate also developed, holding that the Imamate was hereditary to any descendent of Hassan or Hussein, but not by appointment or heredity alone.  The Zaidi Imam was not quiescent. The Imam deserved that position by emerging from the community as a righteous leader, who was qualified and who could inspire the people to righteous action – the true meaning of Jihad, as we shall see later (inshaa Allah). The Zaidi Imams, then became foremost, protectors of the faith, but also enforcement authorities, for example the Imams of Yemen.

Hence, both the Sunni and Shia then began to distinguish Imamate from Khalifat.  Imamate became restricted to judicial and interpretive authority, and Khalifat to primarily, enforcement authority, with the ultimate authority for religious affairs and regulation of the Ulema.

The Abbasid Khalifat lasted until the Mongul sacking of Baghdad in 1258 CE.  After that, our nations fell under the rule of petty sultans, and amirs.  It was during this period that Ibn Taymiyyah wrote much on Khalifat.  He had a dim view of the Khalifs.  His Khalif abandoned Baghdad.  He felt that enforcement authority should not be centralized, and that judicial authority should be independent.  In his time, the Khalifat was a straw man.  Although it regained power under the Turks – the Ottomans – it finally breathed its last after World War I.  Ibn Taymiyyah would have thought that best.

Since World War I, we have again been ruled by petty sultans and amirs, whether Presidents for Life, or out right dictators, whether petty kings or petty puppets of Western powers. 

Throughout all the permutations of enforcement authority, one thing has remained constant in Islam since the end of the Umayyad period, legislative authority is with Allah, and judicial and interpretive authority is with the Ulema.  Even for the Shia, who at one time had hereditary Imams, today with the occultation of the 12th Ithna Ashari Imam, the judicial and interpretive authority is with the mujtahid marjaa. 

Many, dissatisfied with attempts at Western influenced or Western backed governments, and their associated economic ideologies, be they Capitalist or Communist, have turned to another alternative – governance by religious authority or at least by Islamic principles.  The Ikhwan al Muslimeen called out that “The Qur’an in Our Constitution.”  Ruhullah Khomeini called for Wilayat al Faqih. 

In 1979, the nation of Iran overthrew their Western puppet and placed all their hopes in religious authority.  Ruhullah Khomeini was a philosopher, deeply influence by Plato and his The Republic.  He thought that the Islamic Ulema were uniquely qualified to be the ultimate Philosopher Kings, hence Wilayat – governance – by the Faqih.  He, naturally, was the first Philosopher King of Iran.  Unfortunately, he had a disagreement with his chosen successor, another highly qualified Alem, and chose instead a person who had no qualification other than sycophantic blind following – Ali Khamenei.  And no sooner did Khomeini die, then his system of Wilayat al Faqih devolved into just another tyrannical dictatorship, with a hand picked puppet of the Supreme Leader as President.  [16]

What, then, is the state of modern enforcement authority?  As we noted above, many of the governments of the so-called Muslim world are weak, petty puppet states.  Although the recent Arab Spring movement sought to remove some of these governments, they have not succeeded.  Instead, either new tyrannies have sprung up, or old ones managed to hang on or reinsert themselves.  Nothing has really changed.

In fact, two modern schools of thought have actually hindered progress in creating an Islamic state.  The Ikhwan al Muslimeen proved they do not have the ability to make the Qur’an their constitution.  They have no experience at governance, although that is not entirely their fault.[17]  They talk and talk, but are unable to really act in any meaningful way.  This was born out most recently by the failed administration of Mursi in Egypt.

And the Salafi are just as bad.  With doctrines cranked out by sycophants of the Saudi kings, they interpreted the ayat ordering obedience to waliyyu l’amr to mean that one must obey any state’s leaders as long as they keep law and order, even if they are not really practicing Muslims.  So, they railed against the Saudi royals from the minbars, but then further railed that it was haram to revolt against the civil authorities – anywhere. 

Of course, the Salafi are also divided between those that follow Shaikh bin Bazz and Shaikh Uthaimin, who allow some rational methods in Usool al Fiqh; and the followers of Shaikh Nasirudeen Albani, who follow the literalism of Ibn Hazm and the very shaky foundation for acceptance of hadith of Albani.  Albani, RA, attempted a great effort to critique all hadith, but unfortunately chose a methodology that is very shaky.  Shahrazuhri, the great scholar of hadith, stated in the 1100’s that to grade a hadith by Ilm al Rijal (The Science of Knowledge of the Narrators) alone was not possible.  Shaikh Albani graded hadith by Ilm al Rijal alone, and even Shaikh bin Bazz and Shaikh Uthaimin told him this was not acceptable.  The school of thought he founded has consistently had the most literal and consequently intolerant interpretations of Qur’anic ayaat and hadith.  And many of these questionable interpretations have influenced a generation of Imams and Dai’yas educated in the Schools of Dawa in Saudi Arabia or the Madrasas of Pakistan.  These erroneous interpretations have been hijacked by violent extremists and have now fueled the delusions of grandeur of al-Baghdadi and the Dawlat al Shaytan.  In fact, the interpretations proffered by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi come straight from the Zahiri Salafi “playbook.”

 Only Iraq has attempted a more consensus approach, but outside interference from America and Iran, continue to make real consensus impossible.  The ecumenicalism of the Sadrist movement has great potential.  Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s conceptions of
Wilayat al Ummah, and Usul al Fiqh based on the Maqaasid ash-Shariah hold out hope for a madhdhab that can be utilized by both Sunni and Shia.  Considering that our current conceptions of Imamate and Khalifate are dovetailing, we could see a future unified Islamic movement.  The possibilities of this movement are seen clearly in the jumu’ah prayers held in Sadrist masaajid, the only ones that defied the regime of Saddam and remained open.  Muqtada as-Sadr regularly leads salaat for both Sunni and Shia.  And he has the ability to unite Southern Arabs and Kurds as well, crossing ethnic lines.  Such achievements give great hope for the future of Iraq and Syria, lands of multiethnic and multi-sectarian peoples.   We hope in the future, that Iraq and Syria both will be able to institute Wilayat al Ummah and Islamic Shura Democracy. 

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[1] Elsewhere we have discussed the epistemological status of wahy as one of the three forms of knowledge; acquired, rational, and revealed.

[2] Al-Mawardi states that leadership “comes in two ways.”  The first of these is by persons of power and influence, ahl al quwa’a wa al-nafudh, not the general body of Muslims.  The second is by delegation from the previous Imam.  Al-Ihkam as-Sultaniyyah, p. 12.

[3] In fact, the Quraish did not even accept anyone with non-Quraishi heritage as fully Quraish.  They did not accept Abdul Muttalib and is family as fully Quraish since Abdul Muttalib’s mother was from the Bani Najjar of Yathrib.  This was one of reasons they boycotted the whole subclan during the Boycott, not just the Muslim members.

[4] In regard to the hadith of Ghadir Khum, we should note Ali ibn Abi Talib was appointed Wasi.  Of course he was. The Prophet had no son, therefore, he had no one to naturally handle his Wasiyyah or Will.  Therefore, he named Ali as the Wasi, the Personal Representative of his Estate.  Ali was natural because he was the husband of the heir to receive the largest share under the laws of Inheritance, Fatimah, and the father of the two other potential heirs, Hassan and Hussein.  Abbas, Jaafar and Aqeel had no such relationships. Moreover, the Prophet’s wives were only entitled to a share of 1/6^th of the Estate.  Futhermore, some of them had fathers to defend their rights, should that have been an issue. 

[5] “The Battle of Uhud,” IslamStory Website, http://islamstory.com/en/node/27554, access 4/3/2015.

[6] Chapter 50: Battle of Taif, Al-Islam.org Website, http://www.al-islam.org/the-message-ayatullah-jafar-subhani/chapter-50-battle-ta%E2%80%99if#events-after-war, accessed 4/3/2015.

[7] Only Umar Ibn Abdul Aziz, who commissioned Ibn Shihab Al-Zuhri to collect hadith, could be considered a Sunni.

[8] We noted before that this includes acquired, rational and revealed knowledge.  Islamic epistemology is most clearly expressed by Suhrawardi, Sadr al Din Shirazi, Qutb al Din Shirazi, and Sayed Muhammad Baqir al Sadr.  Because all of these figures are considered Shia, they are not known to Sunnis.  However, Sunni doctrine clearly holds that revelation is a form of knowledge and is the most certain.  For example, in explaining practices such as wiping over khuff by wiping the top of the khuff and not the bottom, Sunnis explain that while reason might suggest that wiping the bottom would be best, the Prophet clearly wiped the top, and that this is a matter of revelation, not of reason or acquired knowledge – it is based on wahy. 

[9] Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, Abu’l Hasan al-Mawardi, trans. Dr. Asadullah Yate, Ta-Ha Publishers (London, 1996) p. 11. 

[10] Id. p. 10.

[11] Id.

[12] This story is mentioned by al-Mawardi.  Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, p. 12.

[13] “The Imams are of Quraish.”  “Give precedence to the Quraish and do not put others before them.”  Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, p. 12.

[14] Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, p. 12.

[15] Id.

[16] Allah SWT alone knows how things will turn out in Iran now that that some one not directly controlled by Khamenei, namely Rouhani, is in power.  We hope it will bode well for the future of a real Iranian Wilayat al Ummah.  It should also be noted that supporters of Khomeini’s doctrines have tried to characterize the work of Muhammad Baqir al Sadr as supporting Khomeini’s doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih.  Although al-Sadr did support an Islamic State in Iran, he did not live to see the actual practice of Khomeini’s doctrines.  We can only assume that with his instance of freedom from torture and tyranny, he would have been appalled at the outcome. 

[17] On one hand, the Ikhwan were prevented from gaining experience by being banned from holding any office.  On the other hand, they failed to seek leadership training on their own. Many went over seas and obtained degrees, but too many failed to gain critical expertise and experience in governance and administration.  Perhaps more negligently, they failed to be anything more than a tribal “old boys” network of mutual support for parasitic fundraisers and activists.  These activists have no job skills, no real world experience, useless degrees from their own degree mills, and an inability to implement anything.